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A.1 The household’s problem
The household maximizes (1) subject to (4) and (6). Assuming that the equilibrium nominal
interest rate is positive and therefore (6) will always hold with equality, (6) can be substituted
into (4) to get
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Then the household’s problem reduces to maximizing (1) subject to (A.1). The first order
conditions with respect to consumption choices are given by
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where the law of motion of multipliers can be obtained from the choice for state-contingent
assets.
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Equations (A.2a) - (A.3) together yield the standard asset pricing equation
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Define Rt ≡
(∫
Q (ht+1|h
t) dht+1
)−1
. Then, integrating (A.4) over ht+1 obtains
βEt
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)−1(
Pt
Pt+1
)}
= R−1t ,
which is the Euler equation in the main text (after replacing arguments ht by t subscripts).
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The choice for the supply of labor is given by
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which, using (A.2a) and (A.3) with (A.5), yields
χ Nφt Ct =
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t
)
.
Risk sharing The existence of complete set of domestic currency state contingent bonds
obtains the following Euler condition for the rest-of-the-world households:
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which after combining with (A.4) obtains the following risk sharing condition:
Ct = Υ C
∗
t Qt, (A.6)
where Q ≡ S P
∗
P
is the real exchange rate; Υ is a constant that depends on the initial wealth
distribution of the world economy.
A.2 Goods and money market equilibrium
The market clearing condition for domestic output can be written as
Yt(i) = CH,t(i) +C
∗
H,t(i) +GH,t (i) ,
where C∗H,t(i) is the foreign demand for the home good i. Using (2), (3) and (19) we can rewrite
the above expression as
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Note that C∗t = B
∗
t Y
∗
t . Then, using risk sharing condition, Ct = Υ C
∗
t Qt and setting
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we can rewrite the above expression as
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Substituting (A.7) into the definition of aggregate output Yt =
[
1∫
0
Yt(i)1−
1
ǫ di
] ǫ
ǫ−1
, and using
(20) along with the basic identities for PH,t, Qt, and Zt, we get
BtYt = Υ Zt B
∗Y ∗t , (A.8)
which leads to equation (21) in the log-linear form.
A.3 Social planner’s problem
Here we characterize the optimal allocation from the point of view of a social planner facing
the resource constraints that the small open economy is subject to in equilibrium, and given
our assumption of complete markets. The social planners problem is to maximize
log(Ct+i)− χ
N1+ϕt+i
1 + ϕ
,
subject to
Yt = At Nt,
and
Ct = (BtYt)
1−α (ΥB∗t Y
∗
t )
α ,
where the latter is obtained by combining (A.6) and (A.8). It is easy to show that the optimal
allocation must satisfy N = (1− α)
1
1+ϕ . Since Y = A N , fluctuations in the efficient level of
output are given by yEt = at.
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A.4 Loss Function
Following Woodford (2003), Gali and Monacelli (2002), and Walsh (2003), in this section we
develop the loss function for the policymaker. Taking the second order Taylor approximation
for the consumption path of the utility we get: and ignoring terms of order J i for i ≥ 2 we get
U(Ct) = U(C) + Uc(C)C[ct]. (A.9)
We now obtain an expression for the disutility of work. Following Walsh (2003), the second
order Taylor expansion for V (N) is
V (Nt) ≈ V (N) + VN(N)Y
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1
2
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2
]
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Combining Equations A.9 and A.10 we get
U(Ct)− V (Nt) = U(C)− V (N) + Uc(C)C [ct]
− VN(N)Y
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]
.
Noting that P
PH
= Zα and using (A.6) and (A.8) we can write he steady state labor market
clearing condition as
V N B¯ Y¯
UcC
=
WX¯
PH
, (A.11)
where X¯ =
(
V¯ +
(
1− V¯
)
R¯−1
)
We know the steady state labor market equilibrium condition
becomes W
PH
= 1
µ
. We now define Ω such that
1−Ω =
X¯
µ B¯ (1− α)
, (A.12)
where Ω is a measure of the distortions in the economy. Equation (A.12) shows that these
distortions include those arising due to market power, fiscal shocks, transaction frictions and
the incentive to manipulate the terms of trade.12
V NY = UcC (1−Ω) (1− α) .
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We will assume Ω to be very small such that terms like (1−Ω) y2t ≈ y
2
t . Substituting for ct
from (22) the utility approximation can be written as
U(Ct)− V (Nt) = U(C)− V (N)−
1
2
Uc(C)C (1− α)
{
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∗]2
}
(A.13)
−
1
2
Uc(C)C(
1
ǫ
) (1− α) variyt(i)
+ terms independent of policy,
where κ∗ = Ω1+ϕ . Using the procedure detailed in Ravenna-Walsh (2003), Woodford (2003), the
above expression representing the present discounted value of the utility of the representative
household can be approximated by
∞∑
t=0
βtUt ≈ U −̥
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
π2H,t + ω (yt − at − κ
∗)2
]
, (A.14)
where ̥ = UcC¯
(1−α)
2
[
θ
(1−θ)(1−θβ)
]
ǫ, ω =
[
(1−θ)(1−θβ)
θ
] (
1+ϕ
ǫ
)
= κ(1+ϕ)
ǫ
, and κ∗ is the gap
between flexible price steady state output level and the efficient steady state output level.
Since our focus is on stabilization policies, we will follow the literature in assuming that there
are fiscal subsidies that eliminate these efficiency distortions so that κ∗ = 0.
A.5 Policy under discretion
Formally, the problem of the central bank is to choose xt, πH,t, and rt at t, such that it
maximizes (33) subject to (31) and (32) while households’ expectations are taken as given.
Letting λ1and λ2 be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with (32) and (31) yields the following
first order conditions:
−ωxt + λ1 − κ(1 + ϕ)λ2 = 0, (A.15a)
−πH,t + λ2 = 0, (A.15b)
λ1 − κδ1λ2 = 0, (A.15c)
with respect to xt, πH,t, and rt, respectively. Eliminating λ1 and λ2 from the above equations
gets (34).
5
Inflation dynamics under discretion Combining (31), (32), and (34) we get
πt = ̟1Etπt+1 −̟2at −̟3vt +̟4bt,
where̟1 =
[β−κδ1Θ+κδ1]
[1+κΘ{(1+ϕ−δ1)}]
,̟2 =
κδ1(1−ρa)
[1+κΘ{1+ϕ−δ1}]
,̟3 =
κδ0
[1+κΘ{(1+ϕ−δ1)}]
,̟4 =
κ[1−δ1(1−ρb)]
[1+κΘ{(1+ϕ−δ1)}]
.
Note ̟1, ̟2, ̟3, ̟4 > 0 and Θ = ǫ
[
1− 11+ϕδ1
]
. For values listed in Table 1 the absolute
value of ̟1 ∈ [0, 1), implying inflation has a stationary solution. Assuming assume at, vt,
and bt are all AR(1) processes, we can solve forward to obtain (35), where φb =
̟4
(1−̟1ρb)
,
φa =
̟2
(1−̟1ρa)
, φv =
̟3
(1−̟1ρv)
.
A.6 Policy under full commitment
The problem of the policymaker can be expressed as:
−
1
2

∑∞
t=0 β
t{π2H,t + ω x
2
t
+2 Θt [xt − Etxt+1 + (rt −Et πH,t+1)− ut]
+2 Ψt [πH,t − βEtπH,t+1 − κ (1 + ϕ)xt − κδ1rt + κδ0vt − κbt]}

,
where 2Θt and 2Ψt are the state contingent multipliers associated with the two constraints
respectively. The first order conditions with respect to xt, πH,t, and rt are:
ω xt +Θt −
Θt−1
β
−Ψt (1 + ϕ)κ = 0, (A.16a)
πH,t−
Θt−1
β
+ (Ψt −Ψt−1) = 0, (A.16b)
Θt − κδ1Ψt = 0, (A.16c)
A full commitment plan is defined as a bounded solution {πH,t, xt, rt, Θt, Ψt}
∞
t=0 to the
system of equations (32), (31), (A.16a) - (A.16c) along with the initial conditions Θ−1, Ψ−1 = 0.
Combining (A.16a) and (A.16c) rewrite
Ψt =
1
κ [(1 + ϕ)− δ1]
(
ω xt −
Θt−1
β
)
.
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Use the above with (A.16b) to obtain
xt − xt−1 = −
κ [(1 + ϕ)− δ1]
ω
πH,t+
κ [(1 + ϕ)− δ1] Θt−1
ω β
+
Θt−1 −Θt−2
ω β︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φt−1
,
which using ω = κ(1+ϕ)
ǫ
is expressed as (36) in the main text.
A.7 Fixed exchange rates
Using (37) to substitute for zt in (21), and using the resulting expression in (25) yields
mct = − (1 + ϕ) pH,t − (1 + ϕ)at − δ0vt − ϕbt,
which combined with (18) obtains
ΛepH,t = pH,t−1 + βEt {pH,t+1} − κ(1 + ϕ)at − κδ0vt − κϕbt,
where Λe = 1 + β + κ(1 + ϕ). Taking shocks one at a time, it can be shown that
pH,t = Ψe pH,t−1 −Ωex xt, x = a, v, and b.
where Ψe =
1
2β
(
Λe −
√
Λ2e − 4β
)
and Ωea =
κ(1+ϕ)
Λe−βΨe−βρa
, Ωev =
κδ0
Λe−βΨe−βρv
, and Ωeb =
κϕ
Λe−βΨe−βρb
. Under our parameter assumptions (see Table 1) Ωea, Ωev, Ωev > 0.
A.8 Monetary targeting
A.8.1 Domestic prices
Analogous to the case of fixed exchange rates, we can combine (18), (21), (25), (40) to obtain
ΛM pH,t = pH,t−1 + β EtpH,t+1 + ξv vt − ξa at + ξb bt,
where
ΛM = (1 + β + κ (1 + ϕ)) ; ξv =
(
[κ (1 + ϕ− δ1) + κδ1ρv]
V¯(
1− V¯
) − κδ0
)
;
ξa = κ(1 + ϕ); ξb = κ (1− δ1 + δ1ρb) .
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For the parameter values listed in Table 1, ΛM , ξv, ξa, ξb > 0. Taking shocks one at a time, it
can be shown that
pH,t = ΨM pH,t−1 +ΩMχ χt, χ = v, and b,
whereΨM =
1
2β
(
ΛM −
√
Λ2M − 4β
)
∈ (0, 1) ,ΩMv =
ξv
ΛM−βΨM−βρv
> 0, ΩMb =
ξq
ΛM−βΨM−βρq
>
0 under our parameter assumptions (see Table 1).
A.8.2 Exchange rates and Nominal interest rates under monetary targeting
Velocity shocks To obtain the path of nominal exchange rates under monetary targeting
when there are shocks to velocity we combine (13), (21), and (40) to get nominal exchange rate
as
st = pH,t + yt =
V¯(
1− V¯
)vt.
The path of nominal interest rates rt =
V¯
(1−V¯ )
(Etvt+1 − vt) can be obtained by combining (31)
and (40).
Fiscal shocks To understand the response of the nominal exchange, we first combine (13),
(21) with (40) to obtain
st = pH,t + yt + bt = bt, (A.17)
where the second equality follows from (40) after substituting vt = 0. The path of the nominal
interest rates rt = (Etbt+1 − bt) can be obtained by combining (31), and (40).
A.9 Domestic inflation targeting
Setting rt = τπH,t and plugging into (31) and (32) the equilibrium conditions can be summa-
rized by means of the difference equation xt
πH,t
 = AT
 Et {xt+1}
Et {πH,t+1}
 ,
8
where
AT =
 −τκr+1−τκr+τκx+1 −β τ−τκr+τκx+1 + −τκr+1−τκr+τκx+1
κx
−τκr+τκx+1
β
−τκr+τκx+1
+ κx−τκr+τκx+1
 ,
where κx = κ (1 + ϕ) and κr = κa1. For the values listed in Table 1, it is easily verified that
both the eigenvalues of AT lie inside the unit circle thereby establishing determinacy.
Combining (31), (32) and (27) obtains
pt = ΨT1 pt−1 +ΨT2 Etpt+1 −ΨT3 Etpt+2 +ΩTχ χt, (A.18)
where ΨT1 =
1
Υ
[
(1−κδ1τ)
κ(1+ϕ) + τ
]
, ΨT2 =
1
Υ
[
(1−κδ1τ)
κ(1+ϕ) + 1 +
2β
κ(1+ϕ)
]
, ΨT3 =
β
Υκ(1+ϕ) ,
Υ =
[
2(1−κδ1τ)
κ(1+ϕ) + τ + 1 +
β
κ(1+ϕ)
]
, ΩTa = −
(1−ρa)
Υ , ΩTv = −
κδ0
κΥ[(1+ϕ)] [(1− ρv)] , ΩTb =
− 1Υ
[
ϕ(1−ρb)
[(1+ϕ)]
]
and at, vt, and bt are all AR(1) processes with autocorrelation coefficients ρa,
ρv, and ρb, respectively. Equation (A.18) can be rewritten as
pt =
ΨT2
ΨT3︸︷︷︸
a
pt−1 −
1
ΨT3︸︷︷︸
b
pt−2 +
ΨT1
ΨT3︸︷︷︸
c
pt−3. (A.19)
The characteristic polynominal associated with (A.19) is
1− a x+ bx2 − cx3 = 0.
For values listed in Table 1, the three roots of the above equation are found to lie inside the
unit circle implying domestic price level exhibits a non-stationarity process.
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